I. INTRODUCTION[1]

Collecting and gathering information on potential threats…analyzing and preparing reports on impending and ongoing crises….reporting and participating in international security agenda setting. What is intelligence? Who conducts intelligence? And who can anticipate threats to international security? International non-state intelligence activities represent a growing presence and sophistication within the international security system. International non-governmental organizations (INGO)[2] are involved in numerous areas of security that contribute directly to international peace and security.

This paper explores why and how INGOs are conducting intelligence[3] for international security purposes. An important reason for exploring this topic is due to the role of information advantage, both on the intelligence battlefield and in increasing international security overall. Information advantage is important to all international actors that are interested in any or all of the following: gaining greater understanding of the threat(s); creating effective strategies to limit the impact of threats; assessing conflict zones; or keeping actors accountable, the greater the interest of international stability and overall security.

[2] For the purposes of this paper, INGOs will refer to international non-governmental, non-profit, organizations involved in international peace and security; including issues like relief and humanitarian aid work on the ground (i.e. conflict management) as well as monitoring and reporting (i.e. conflict prevention) on issues of instability like human rights abuses and violations, disarmament, or transnational terrorism.
[3] This paper adopts a broad definition of intelligence, focusing primarily on the intelligence cycle (process), referring to the four main intelligence components. This research will also refer to Robert Steele's Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) framework as well. Please see: "Appendix A - Intelligence Cycle."

While international security academics and policymakers have shown an overwhelming interest in a different kind of non-state actor, terrorist organizations, there remains unequal consideration[4] of the likely possibility of other international security contributors.[5] This research addresses this theoretical and strategic policy gap by attempting to identify other international intelligence power centers within the current international system. This paper submits that non-state intelligence activities for international security purposes do exist. The case studies present evidence of not only the presence of an intelligence process, but particular capabilities in threat assessment and early warning.

The remainder of this introductory section will provide a literature review, hypothesis, and case studies methodology. I will then present a case highlighting the changes within the international security system that have created an environment for increased non-state presence and activities. Next, I will argue that these changes affect intelligence requirements and capabilities. This will then lead into the case studies, which are International Crisis Group (ICG) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Following a summary of findings, the conclusions section will outline policy, and conclude with suggestions for further research.

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[4] Bruce Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman's short note on NGOs and NSAs reflect this inclination. While they make very similar arguments that will presented in this paper, they focus on how these changes (i.e. advances in technology or the ability for NSAs to coordinate and communicate) empower terrorist and international criminal organizations, rather than giving further consideration or insight into how NGOs might enhance their intelligence capabilities as well. Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, *Best Truth: Intelligence in the information age* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 7-12.

[5] My research is interested in identifying intelligence activities occurring outside of the traditional state intelligence apparatus. However, as will be discussed in the policy considerations section, I do not make the argument for states to somehow control or use this information for their specific national security strategy.